


Part Two

Nonviolence and Politics:



Tibet's Roles and Responsibilities

Chapter Four



The Tibetan uprising of 1959, showing women demonstrating before the Potala.

A Brief History of Peace and War in Tibet

"The Tibetan people are eager to contribute to regional and world peace, and I believe they are in a unique position to do so. Traditionally, Tibetans are a peace-loving and nonviolent people. Since Buddhism was introduced to Tibet over 1000 years ago, Tibetans have practiced nonviolence with respect to all forms of life."

—The Dalai Lama

The history of Tibet, like any other nation, includes wars, bloodshed, violence and power struggles. What makes it unique is the strong religious element in its politics that causes its modern-day image to be that of a “peace-loving nation.” In this chapter, I will explore in brief the history of Tibet and how it came to be viewed as it is today. I will focus on the events that involved either a violent or nonviolent solution to a conflict, as well as those relevant to the evolution of Buddhism in Tibet. From 630 to 1949, my primary source will be Tibet—A Political History by Tsepon Shakabpa. Through the Chinese invasion and independence struggle after 1949, I will compare different perspectives on the guerrilla resistance movement and the nonviolent strategies used in attempts to free Tibet from Chinese occupation.

In the 630’s, when Songtsen Gampo, the first of the “Religious Kings” in Tibet, was in his early twenties, he sought the hand of the Chinese Princess Wenchen Kungchu in marriage. Another regional Chinese leader wanted to marry her as well, so “Songtsen Gampo sent his troops against (him) and defeated them. Having recruited 200,000 troops in all, the Tibetans then attacked and captured the city of Sungchou.” (T 26) Songtsen Gampo again asked for the Princess’ hand in marriage, but was refused. The Tibetan army fought and defeated the Chinese, and the Princess was sent to Lhasa for the wedding. The Princess brought with her a sacred image of Gautama Buddha, which was put in a brilliant temple near the Potala, which still stands. During Songtsen Gampo’s

reign, “the Tibetans had conquered parts of upper Burma and, in 640, occupied Nepal, remaining there for a number of years.” (T 27)

“In the year 648, the Chinese Emperor sent a goodwill mission to the court of the Indian Emperor.” (T 27) The old emperor had been replaced by Arjuna, who “was intolerant of Buddhism and its followers. Under his order, all members of the goodwill mission were slaughtered, with the exception of (the leader) who managed to escape to Nepal. From Nepal, which was a dependency of Tibet at the time, (the leader) appealed to Songtsen Gampo for help and received 12,000 mounted troops from Tibet and 7000 from Nepal. They marched into India and fought a three-day battle, which ended in the capture and deposition of Arjuna.” (T 28) Songtsen Gampo was sent many gifts for his military support. “The Chinese Emperor was so grateful to Songtsen for his (help) that he stipulated that upon his own death, a statue of the Tibetan King should be erected beside his grave.” (T 28) Songtsen Gampo was considered a great Dharma King of Tibet, and upon his death in 649, he is believed to have been absorbed into a statue of Avalokitesvara—the deity of compassion. Military might played an important role in his rule. For the next hundred years, Tibet and China took turns capturing one another’s territory, with the Tibetan army proving superior in most cases.

In 775, Trisong Detsen took the throne. He is not only one of Tibet's most important kings, but is considered to be an enlightened being and one of the more important Buddhist figures in the Nyingma school. One of his main goals was to spread Buddhism far and wide in Tibet. There were two pro-Bon ministers in the way. Two other ministers who supported Trisong Detsen "bribed an oracle to predict a great famine and epidemic for the country and a short life for the King unless two loyal subjects

offered themselves as a sacrifice for the welfare of the King and the country." (T 35) The two Bon monasteries were coerced into volunteering. One account says that the two were entombed, in accordance with the prophecy. One "made secret arrangements and escaped from the tomb, leaving (the other) to die." (T 35) Another account says they were exiled to a graveyard where they spent the remainder of their lives as the "living dead."

With these two out of the way, Santiraksita—the great Indian *pandit*—came to Tibet to teach Buddhism. He saw a lot of obstacles that made his task difficult, and suggested Padmasambhava be invited to Tibet to clear them. The King did just that, and "Guru Rinpoche" (Padmasambhava's Tibetan name) made Tibet a sanctuary for Buddhism. In 792, there was a debate between a Chinese monk who defended the instantaneous system of enlightenment and an Indian monk who defended a gradual approach. The Indian won. "It should be noted that the defeat of the Chinese system of Buddhism, which preached 'instantaneous enlightenment,' may have been influenced by the political events of the time, for there was a constant state of border conflicts between China and Tibet throughout the latter half of the eighth century. Repeated battles with the Chinese increased the tension between the two countries to the point where in 763 the King, Trisong Detsen, ordered an army of 200,000 men to (invade China)." (T 39) They took several cities in China, until "the Tibetans advanced rapidly toward the Chinese capitol. The Emperor had fled from the capitol. Once in the capitol, the Tibetans set up (the) Prince as Emperor. Whenever a new emperor was enthroned in China, it marked the beginning of a new year; therefore, the Tibetans declared that a new year had begun.

They obtained a letter from the new Emperor guaranteeing annual tribute and then, fifteen days later, they withdrew from the Chinese capitol.” (T 39)

“In 783, peace negotiations between Tibet and China took place, resulting in the treaty of Chingshui, which established the boundaries between the two countries.” (T 41) Tibet’s military dominance was widely known. In The 780’s, King Trisong Detsen sent a religious mission to get some religious artifacts in India. When a Maharaja in India saw them coming, “He mistook it for the vanguard of an army. Assuming that it would be followed immediately by foot soldiers and elephants, as was the military practice in India, the Maharaja offered to surrender; but it was a religious mission and not sent to make territorial conquests. The Tibetan troops crossed the sacred Ganges and arrived at Magadha in Bihar (where the local ruler,) knowing the Tibetans would not attack the monastery, deposited most of their possessions there and then fled eastward; however, the Tibetans continued to Bodh Gaya.” (T 44) They got the relics and returned to Tibet.

“Tibetan power spread far and wide in the later part of Trisong Detsen’s reign.” (T 44) As a result, an Arabian warlord allied himself with the Chinese to put the Tibetans in check. There were fierce battles fought at the border with China, but “the Tibetans succeeded in holding their own without substantial loss of territory. As Petech has written, ‘The very fact that nothing less than the coalition of the two most powerful empires of the early Middle-Ages was necessary for checking the expansion of the Tibetan state, is a magnificent witness of the political capacities and military valor of those sturdy mountaineers.’ The Tibetans were continually engaged in launching attacks to the West between the years 785 and 805.” (T 44)

In the early 800's, "the rumor was that an invasion of Tibet was about to take place and would come from four directions. (A) minister supposedly asked, 'Will we kill a hundred or a thousand of the enemy? Or will we have to flee? Let us have faith in Buddha and consult Padmasambhava, now meditating in the hills near Samye.' When consulted, Padmasambhava agreed that the news was serious and advised everyone to perform the ritual called *Dasi*. The invasion never took place." (T 45)

A pillar dedicated to the King said, "The extent of your magnificent Empire has brought greatness to Tibet. We are a happy people, peacefully practicing our religion because of your compassionate heart. Not only are you generous and kind to your human subjects, but to all living creatures as well. That is why men have given you the name Great Enlightened Miraculous Divine Lord." (T 46) King Trisong Detsen's military prowess was perhaps unrivaled in the history of Tibet. Yet, the most prominent living Buddha in the Nyingma Tradition in recent times, Ringzin Jigme Lingpa, is considered to be his incarnation.

King Tride Detsen succeeded Trisong Detsen as king, and brought in many Indian scholars to translate Buddhist texts. The King signed "an extensive document pledging support for the propagation of the Buddhist faith." (T 48) "During (his) reign, the Tibetan army continued to harass the Arabs in the west." (T 48) The next King, Ralpachen, continued the work of bringing in scholars to translate texts, and initiated the making of a Sanskrit-Tibetan dictionary. "After coming to the throne, Ralpachen sent troops towards the Chinese border. Buddhists in China and in India sought mediation, and finally both countries sent representatives to the border. A meeting was held in 821 and a peace treaty concluded." (T 49) Three pillars were erected with the text of the

treaty on them, in the Chinese capital, Lhasa and the border. “At the time of swearing to uphold the treaty, there were two religious ceremonies performed: the Bon ritual of animal sacrifice and the Buddhist ritual of invoking the sacred trinity of the sun, moon and stars as witnesses.” (T 49) Ralpachen had many policies friendly to the propagation of Buddhism, including “as an encouragement to others to become monks, (he) decreed that for each monk seven households would have to provide for his needs.” (T 50)

His brother, later known as Lang Darma, was a supporter of the Bon religion and despised the King. He decided to take the throne through a series of assassinations. First, the King’s trusted Buddhist minister was killed by two other ministers, who supported Lang Darma. The account reads, “When (he) did not succumb immediately to their knife assault, they suffocated him by stuffing cloth down (his) throat. The queen, in distress, jumped over the palace wall to her death.” (T 51) Soon after, in 836, “Ralpachen was drinking beer and sunning himself in the garden, when (the two ministers who supported Lang Darma) crept up behind him. Grabbing him by the neck, they twisted his head around until his neck was broken.” (T 51)

The pro-Bon ministers then placed Darma on the throne without any opposition. During Lang Darma’s rule, Buddhism was effectively banned in central Tibet. “The Buddhist monks were ordered to choose whether to marry, to carry arms and become huntsmen, or to declare themselves to be followers of the Bon religion by ringing a bell wherever they went. Failure to comply with any of these orders was punishable by death. Monks were executed for refusing to abandon their Buddhist faith.” (T 51) “By 842 religious persecution had become so intense that a monk, Lhalung Palgye Dorje, who was doing meditation (in a cave near Lhasa), decided to do something about it. (He) set out

for Lhasa, wearing a black hat and a black cloak with a white lining. He smeared charcoal on his white horse and concealed his bow and arrow in the long, flowing sleeves of his cloak.” (T 52) The king was outside the palace, and the monk shot him in the heart with the arrow. The monk then hopped on his horse, reversed his clothing to make it white, and took his horse through the river, which turned the horse white as well. He escaped unnoticed and went back to his cave to continue his meditation. With the death of Lang Darma, the era of the Religious Kings came to an end.

“The assassination of Lang Darma in 842 led to a schism in the royal lineage and the beginning of decentralization of authority. Nothing approaching central authority was restored until 1247, when Sakya Pandita was invested with the right to rule over (all of) Tibet by Prince Godan, a grandson of Genghis Khan. The dates 842 and 1247 therefore mark the period of decentralized control in central Tibet, during which time the country consisted of many small hegemonies, which were constantly warring against, or allying with, each other as conditions warranted.” (T 54)

After Genghis Khan died in 1227, the Tibetans failed to pay a tribute. Thirty thousand Mongol troops came into Tibet and burned down monasteries in revenge, killing hundreds of monks. With this military mission came a letter from Prince Godan to the Pandit Atisha, requesting he come to Mongolia to teach the Prince and spread the Dharma. The letter said, “The Lord Buddha gave his life for all living beings. Would you not, therefore, be denying your faith if you tried to avoid this duty of yours? It would, of course, be easy for me to send a large body of troops to bring you here; but in so doing, harm and unhappiness might be brought to many innocent living beings. In the interest of the Buddhist faith and the welfare of all living creatures, I suggest that you

come to us immediately.” (T 62) Sakya Pandita came to Mongolia and “instructed Godan in the teachings of the Buddha and even persuaded him to refrain from throwing large numbers of Chinese into the nearby river (which he did to minimize their population and subsequent threats to his power).” (T 63)

In exchange for religious instruction, Mongolia agreed to protect Tibet from invasion and with other political matters. Thus, a priest/patron relationship was established. This relationship continued with the son of the Prince, Kublai Khan, and the son of Sakya Pandita, named Phagpa. In granting Phagpa full power over Tibet, Kublai Khan wrote, “Monks should refrain from quarreling among themselves and from indulging in violence. They should live peaceably and happily together.” (T 66) This seems to indicate fighting between the Kagyu and Sakya schools was beginning to be a problem. Phagpa’s strong loyalty to Mongolia was resented, and in 1280 he was murdered at Sakya monastery, presumably by Kagyu supporters.

“It is said that Kublai Khan was planning to attack India and Nepal by sending his armies through Tibet. The yogi Ugyen Sengye sent Kublai Khan a long religious poem asking him to desist from waging war against India and Nepal. It would seem the Khan was influenced by these protestations as the projected war was not undertaken.” (T 70)

After the death of Phagpa, the Sakya sect had a lot of internal disputes and schisms.

In one such dispute, involving two parties claiming a territory, the Sakya monastery sent in an army to settle the conflict. With the army prepared for a rebellion, a mediation team was brought in. The leader was very stubborn, and after being tried and convicted by a Sakya court, he was tortured and publicly humiliated. He vowed to bring down the Sakya school and was imprisoned. After he was released from prison, he

sought to overthrow the Sakya with his army. His supporters, led by a military leader named Changchub, successfully assumed rule in all of central Tibet with the exception of the area near Sakya monastery. In 1358, the Sakya Lama was murdered by one of his ministers, as he was trying to mediate between Changchub and the Sakya monastery. Changchub was angered and he took over the Sakya monastery, placing his followers into positions of high office.

During the reign of the Sakya Lama, criminals were executed without trial. Changchub brought in a judiciary system and had 13 levels of punishment. Despite being a great military leader, “Changchub remained, to the end of his life, a strict Buddhist monk.” (T 82) In 1407, the Ming Emperor invited the Karmapa to China, which marked the beginning of the Karma Kagyu sect being a political force. The Emperor gave the Karmapa the title, “Mighty Buddha of Peace.” (T 84) A few years after this, Gelukpa sect founder Tsongkhapa was invited to China. He declined, but sent his disciple, whom the Ming Emperor gave the title, “All-knowing, Understanding and Benevolent Peacemaker of the World.” (T 84)

The king appointed by Changchub and his successor brought peace and prosperity to Tibet, and no military activity occurred. After the death of the king in 1434, this stability came to an end. “The ensuing one hundred years were marked by a constant struggle for power between the provinces of U and Tsang, whose leaders adhered respectively to the Gelukpa and the Karmapa sects.” (T 86) In the mid to late 1400’s, when a new Karma Kagyu monastery was being built outside of Lhasa, “monks from the neighboring Gelukpa monasteries descended on it one night and razed it. A Karmapa Lama narrowly escaped being killed.” (T 87) The Karmapa sect had superior military

support, and they soon took control of the Lhasa area. The Gelukpa monks were persecuted and basically under house arrest during this period. The Kagyu attacked, took over, and converted dozens of Gelukpa monasteries.

In the late 1550's the third Dalai Lama, Sonam Gyatso, "helped prevent violence from breaking out between power factions by his personal mediation" on a number of occasions. (T 92) (The first, post-humously named Dalai Lama, was a disciple of Tsongkhapa, and Sonam Gyatso was his third incarnation). For example in 1595, "fighting broke out in Lhasa between the Gelukpa and Kagypa supporters and the efforts by local lamas at mediation were unsuccessful. They then sent for Sonam Gyatso, whose personal services brought the fighting to an end." (T 92)

The third Dalai Lama became friends with Altan Khan, the leader of Mongolia, who was highly influenced by Sonam Gyatso's religious instruction. Altan Khan made a decree saying,

"Previously, when a Mongol died, his wife, personal servant, horses and livestock were always sacrificed. In the future, this is forbidden! The horses and animals of the deceased may be given by mutual consent to the lamas and monks in the monasteries; and the family, in return, may request the lamas to pray for the deceased. In the future, it is not permitted to sacrifice animals, wives, or servants for the benefit of the deceased. Those responsible for human sacrifices will be executed under the law, or will have their property confiscated. If a horse or any other animal is sacrificed, ten times the number of animals killed will be confiscated. Any person who injures a monk or a lama will be severely punished. The practice of blood sacrifice to the (image) of the deceased is forbidden. The people may instead keep the image of Yeshe Gonpo, a Tibetan deity, in their homes and may offer him milk and butter instead of blood." (T 95)

Sonam Gyatso was the first to receive the title "Dalai Lama," which refers to the ocean-like depth of his mind and spirit. Altan Khan bestowed this title upon him.

In 1605, a poem written to the fourth Dalai Lama by a Karmapa lama was misinterpreted to be an insult. In anger, the Mongolian cavalrymen who had escorted the

Dalai Lama into Tibet “conducted a raid on the stables and houses of the Karmapa Red Hats. As a result, Karma Tensung Wangpo, the Tsang chieftain and Karmapa supporter, led a large body of troops to Lhasa in 1605 and expelled the Mongols. A struggle for political power ensued. The province of U was in the Gelukpa camp, while Tsang province was under the influence of the Karmapa sect.” (T 98)

“The head lama of the Karmapa Red Hats was living near (where the Dalai Lama was visiting) and correspondence was exchanged between the two lamas which might have led to a meeting. Such a meeting might have ended the rivalry between the Gelukpa and Karmapa sects; but the attendants of both the Dalai Lama and the Karmapa Lama did not want a truce, and the Dalai Lama’s followers hurried him away to the Drepung monastery. Poems written at the time blame the attendants on both sides for preventing a meeting which might have led to a reconciliation between the leaders of the two sects.” (T 98)

A few years later, the ruler of Tsang and a Karmapa sect supporter named Karma Phuntsok Namgyal, requested a religious audience with the Dalai Lama. “The Dalai Lama’s influential attendant, Sonam Drakpa, objected to such an audience on the grounds that (he) was an enemy of the Gelukpa sect; therefore (he) received a polite (and false) note saying that the Dalai Lama was deep in meditation and could not be disturbed. The Tsang chief was deeply offended.” (T 99) This incident created a monstrous grudge against the Gelukpa, which would lead to much violence later on. “The insulting treatment that had been accorded Karma Phuntsok Namgyal by the attendants of the fourth Dalai Lama led him to attack Lhasa in 1618. He was met with resistance from the monks of Drepung and Sera, who were reinforced by their lay patrons. A number of

people in Lhasa were killed, and the hill on which Drepung monastery stood was littered with the bodies of slaughtered monks. As a result of that victory of the Tsang forces, a number of small Gelukpa monasteries in U were forcibly changed over to the Karmapa sect. Two Tsang military camps were established outside Lhasa; one cut off the Drepung and Sera monasteries from Lhasa, and the other blocked the main route out of the district. In that way, the two Gelukpa strongholds were effectively blockaded. The Gelukpa monks, who had returned to their monasteries, were severely restricted in their movements.” (T 100)

“At the same time, Phuntsok Namgyal built his own Karmapa monastery at Shigatse at a place overlooking the Tashilhunpo monastery of the Gelukpa. His monastery was known as ‘The Suppressor of Tashilhunpo.’ The stones for this monastery were collected from the hill above Tashilhunpo, and the workers deliberately rolled boulders down on the Gelukpa monks’ quarters, killing a number of them. Tashilhunpo monks were harassed whenever they passed the Karmapa monastery on their way to Shigatse. This persecution continued for some time.” (T 100)

In 1620 the Mongol troops made a sudden attack on the two Tsang military camps. Taken by surprise, most of the Tsang soldiers were killed. Another Tsang army prepared to set out to fight the Mongols. Fearing that this would lead to widespread warfare, “the Panchen Lama, the Ganden Tripa and Taklung Shapdrung set out to mediate between the two rival armies. After negotiation, the Mongols agreed to leave; but on two conditions: the Tsang military camps were to be abolished, and the Gelukpa monasteries, which had been forcibly converted to the Karmapa, were to be restored to their original sectarian status.” (T 101)

Still, the Gelukpa feared the Karmapa sect's desire to wipe them out.

“Representatives of the three big Gelukpa monasteries and their officials and patrons decided to hold a meeting to find ways of preventing the extinction of their sect, which they likened to ‘a lamp flickering in a raging storm.’ ” (T 103) They decided to seek military help from Mongolia. A king in Mongolia who supported the Karmapa sect “sent his son, Arsalan, with 10,000 troops into Tibet to wipe out the Gelukpa sect.” (T 103) The army was intercepted and the leader changed his mind about the Gelukpa. He was granted audience with the Dalai Lama, whom he showed great respect to and vowed loyalty to. The king had his son promptly killed for disobeying. Gushri Khan, who had agreed to help the Gelukpa, then wiped out Arsalan's army in the “Battle of Bloody Hill.”

Soon after, a letter was found from a pro-Bon chief that startled the Gelukpa. It read, “It is a great disappointment that our allies have been wiped out. However, next year, I shall raise an army in Kham and accompany it to U. At the same time, you must bring in your army from Tsang. Together we will completely eliminate the Gelukpa sect, so that no trace of it will ever be found. The image of the Lord Buddha (that the Chinese princess had brought over in the time of Songtsen Gampo) seems to have brought about all these wars and should be thrown in the river. We should allow freedom of worship to all religious sects, including the Bon; the only exception being the Gelukpa.” (T 106)

Gushri Khan set out to kill the Bon king and destroy his army. In response, the fifth Dalai Lama wrote,

“ ‘I am supposed to be a lama. My duty is to study religion, go into meditation, and to preach to others. It seems to me unnecessary to create any more disturbances in the country, as it would only lead to criticism of us by the people. Our relations with the Tsang faction are not as bad as they were last year. They are not persecuting the Gelukpa now, and the harm they caused to Sera and Drepung monasteries was, in fact, the fault of the Gelukpa for refusing to give the

Tsang ruler an audience with the fourth Dalai Lama. I see no reason for competing with the Kagyupa sect. Too many people have suffered in the past and even been killed because of this kind of political activity. I feel that if we are unnecessarily active, we might find ourselves in the same predicament.’ ” (T 106)

“Sonam Chospel, the chief attendant, disagreed with the Dalai Lama, insisting that the Gelukpa sect had been unfairly persecuted by the Tsang ruler. In his opinion, the country had to be unified, if there was to be peace throughout Tibet, instead of the country being left in the hands of various chiefs and religious leaders.” (T 106) Sonam Chospel did not follow the order of the Dalai Lama, and instead wrote to Gushri Khan, “ ‘It is requested that you destroy the Beri chief, who has been giving much trouble to the Buddhist religion in Kham.’ ” (T 106) As a result, the Dalai Lama “wondered if the ‘tune of the flute had not been changed to the song of the arrow.’ ” (T 107) The fighting lasted one year, ending in the execution of the pro-Bon chief and Gushri Khan having control over Kham.

Not content there, Sonam Chospel encouraged Gushri Khan to wipe out all Karmapa forces in Tsang. This made the Dalai Lama upset and he threatened to go to Gushri Khan himself to ask him to go back to Mongolia. Sonam Chospel refused to call off the attack. The Panchen Lama tried to mediate, but was not allowed to go near Gushri Khan for fear of his own safety. Gushri Khan easily conquered many of the districts of Tsang with his large army and reputation as an invincible warrior. He surrounded the fortress of the chief of Tsang, expecting surrender in a matter of days.

In the meantime, Sonam Chospel worked on converting all of U into loyal Gelukpa followers. The Tsangpa chief held out for months, and “Sonam Chospel, who had not expected the Tsangpa forces to put up such resistance, grew alarmed and admitted to the Dalai Lama that he had made an error in judgment. He suggested that the

Dalai Lama should go to Tsang and mediate between the two opposing armies. The Dalai Lama rebuked him, saying,

‘Did I not tell you a number of times that it would be unwise to engage in a war with the Tsang ruler? How can I possibly attempt to mediate when it is already widely known that we sent an official to guide Gushri Khan to Tsang? Even if I did succeed in bringing about an end to the fighting, the Tsangpa forces would take their revenge as soon as Gushri Khan departs for his own country. We must now go through with this war, which you so carelessly begun. If Gushri Khan wins, well and good. If he loses, we shall have to leave Lhasa and find some other country to live in.’ ” (T 110)

Determined to win, Sonam Chospel “prepared to take over the Dongkar fort, a Tsangpa stronghold in U, and with the help of monks from Drepung and Sera he captured it in one day.” (T 110) He then went to Gushri Khan’s camp, and tried to put more pressure on the Tsang ruler to surrender. “The Tsang ruler finally sent word to the Panchen Lama and the Karmapa Lama, asking them to try to arrange a truce; but this was no longer possible as U had openly entered into the war.” (T 110) After a standoff that lasted many months, the Tsang ruler finally surrendered. “The victory was celebrated in Lhasa by the monks of Sera and Drepung, who hoisted prayer flags on rooftops and burned incense everywhere.” (T 110) The fifth Dalai Lama then “promulgated laws of public conduct, appointed governors to different districts, and chose ministers to form a new government.” (T 110)

“A few months later, a Karmapa supporter planned a revolt against (the government). A general uprising took place. In the southeastern region of (Tsang), a major revolt took place, and the monastery of Zingche was burned down by the rebels. Gushri Khan and Sonam Chospel marched to (the area) and there inflicted tremendous casualties on the rebels, killing over seven thousands troops.” (T 112) The Tsang ruler, who had been in jail, was executed as a result of the uprising. “This situation might be

compared to the execution of Mary, Queen of Scots, which finally brought an end to the many plots against the throne of Queen Elizabeth.” (T 112)

Around this time, Tibet and Bhutan had sporadic fighting at their borders. Most of the time, the Panchen Lama would successfully mediate the disputes, other times the Tibetan army would be humiliated in the hot jungle climate of Bhutan. “In 1646 Tibet and Bhutan entered into peaceful negotiations” and agreed to build a friendship and be content with their territories. (T 113) “The peace did not last long; fighting broke out again in the following year.” (T 113) The Tibetans suffered a humiliating loss.

“In 1648 several Kagyupa monasteries were converted to the Gelukpa sect and the monks had no choice but to submit to the forcible change.” (T 113) Taxes were also collected that year, the money going to the monasteries and the general treasury. In 1653, the Dalai Lama accepted an invitation from the Manchu Emperor to visit Peking. He stayed there for several weeks and held meetings with the Emperor, who gave him the title, “Preceptor of the Lord Buddha’s Doctrine, Keeper of Peace in the West, Uniter of the Buddhist Faith Beneath the Sky, Superior of the Ocean, Holder of the Thunderbolt.” (T 117)

In 1662, China asked the Dalai Lama to approach the Mongols about their harassment of Chinese at the border. The Dalai Lama did just that, and the border was subsequently respected. In 1668, monks representing the Panchen Lama prevented a war between Bhutan and Tibet by holding negotiation talks at the border. That same year, “The Dalai Lama was asked to intervene in a dispute between (two tribes) in Mongolia. He sent a representative, who was able to settle their dispute.” (T 119) The sixth Dalai Lama did not take an interest in politics or religion, favoring instead the nightlife, where

he would frequent bars and write poems to his many lovers. This caused a struggle over leadership between the Desi (chief minister) and the grandson of Gushri Khan, named Lhazang Khan. A meeting was held at the Potala to settle the dispute. It was decided that Lhazang Khan should go back to Mongolia, which made him angry. He recruited an army of local Mongols and prepared to storm Lhasa.

“Hearing of this, the Desi sent troops to check the Mongol advance. Immediately representatives of the Dalai Lama and representatives of the three big monasteries set out to mediate. In the meantime, the Panchen Lama himself was on his way to the front to mediate personally between the two forces. On reaching (a town near Lhasa), the Panchen Lama was informed in a letter from the Dalai Lama that successful mediation had taken place and that a cease-fire was in effect.” (T 132)

The Desi, who had actually resigned earlier but retained full control, agreed to leave the area with compensation for his losses. This, it was thought, would avoid further political unrest. On his way out of Lhasa, however, the Desi was captured by Lhazang Khan’s men and shortly after, executed. “Lhazang Khan then came to Lhasa and assumed full political control.” (T 132) He had the sixth Dalai Lama disposed of and exiled.

Drepung monastery gave the Dalai Lama shelter for a few days, with Sera and Ganden monks guarding the gates. “Lhazang Khan soon surrounded the Drepung monastery with large numbers of troops. The Dalai Lama was kept in the monastery for three days; but, aware that his presence could only bring destruction to the monastery and its monks, he insisted on being allowed to leave. After telling the Drepung monks he would see them again, he went out of the monastery and returned to his captors.” (T 133)

Shortly after, on the banks of a nearby lake, the Dalai Lama died. Most believe he was murdered. Lhazang Khan then claimed that due to the sixth Dalai Lama's habits of drinking and sleeping with women, he must have been a fake. He placed a young monk as the "real incarnation," which almost no Tibetans accepted.

In 1717, the Dzungar Mongol army came into Lhasa to give power back to the Tibetans and overthrow Lhazang Khan. They met little resistance, and surrounded the Potala. Lhazang Khan held out for a while, and then in desperation came out of the Potala and "attacked the enemy. Engaging in fierce hand-to-hand combat, he killed eleven men with his own hands, before he himself was struck down and killed." (T 136) The fake sixth Dalai Lama was brought to China and a new Desi was appointed. "The Dzungar Mongols had no liking for the Nyingmapa sect and ruined two of its finest monasteries. Until then, the Dzungars had been popular with the Tibetan people because they had deposed the false Dalai Lama, killed Lhazang Khan and restored the post of Desi to a Tibetan; but popular feelings turned against them when they executed the Nyingmapa lamas and subsequently attacked their monasteries." (T 137)

In 1718, "an imperial army of several thousand men, led by a Manchu officer, advanced (into Western Tibet). There, they were attacked by the Dzungar and Tibetan troops and defeated. Large numbers of Chinese were massacred; few returned to China." (T 139) Later, an army from China who resented the Dzungar influence began a march to Lhasa. At the same time, a large troop of Tibetan soldiers escorted the seventh Dalai Lama to be enthroned in Lhasa. Frightened and bewildered, Lhazang Khan fled the Potala—taking with him as much loot as his men could carry. In 1720, "the seventh Dalai Lama entered Lhasa and was enthroned in the Potala. A provisional military

government was then set up in order to restore peaceful operation of the administration.”
(T 140)

The Desi, whom the Manchu army believed to be a supporter of the Dzungar, was beheaded. “The Tibetan populace resented the execution of the Desi, who had been a figurehead used by the Dzungars.” (T 140) A council of four ministers replaced the position of the Desi. In 1722, with the death of the Manchu Emperor, the Manchu army left Tibet.

The chairmen of the council of ministers was disliked by the other three ministers, and in 1727 as the council was having a meeting, the three other ministers stabbed him to death, and went on to kill his bodyguards, all four of his family members and two of his friends. The military commander Pholhanas was a friend of Khangchennas, and his life was in danger. He gathered an army and fled to Tsang, his stronghold. “Meanwhile, (the three ministers) marched to Tsang. A battle ensued. The fighting lasted, off and on, for several months without decisive victory. Finally, the Panchen Lama, the Sakya Lama, and a representative of the Dalai Lama arrived to mediate. A truce was agreed to (in 1728) and the two armies withdrew from battle.” (T 143) “Shortly thereafter, a man from U killed some Tsang people west of Lhasa. Using the incident as an excuse, Pholhanas broke the truce. He sent his eldest son with nine thousand troops towards Lhasa, while he himself marched north and collected nine thousand troops, (along with) some three thousand nomads and Mongol troops.” (T 143)

“He converged on Lhasa from the northeast meeting only token resistance. (The three ministers) took refuge in the Potala and begged the Dalai Lama to save their lives. Pholhanas’ troops surrounded the Potala. Pholhanas asked that the three ministers be

handed over to him; and he suggested that in the event his appeal was disregarded, the Dalai Lama leave the Potala with an escort for the Drepung monastery. There the Dalai Lama would be safe, because Pholhanas intended to force his rivals out of the Potala. The Dalai Lama finally persuaded Pholhanas to allow the three ministers to live in their homes under close guard until a mission en route from the Manchu Emperor should arrive.” (T 143)

When the expedition arrived, Pholhanas had full control of Lhasa, and the mission agreed to give the three ministers a trial. “The trial lasted seven days and ended in the conviction of the three ministers and fourteen of their closest supporters. On the first of November, all seventeen were executed half a mile west of the Potala. The three ministers were executed by the excruciating process of slicing. The victims were literally sliced into small pieces. This slow, torturous means of execution was carried out in public to (scare) the Lhasa populace. Two lamas in the group were strangled, and the rest were decapitated. The families of the men were also executed.” (T 144)

The Dalai Lama’s father supported the three ministers, and as a result Pholhanas sent both the Dalai Lama and his father to stay in their original house in Kham for seven years. Pholhanas’ “power was strong enough that he was able to ignore the demands of the Lhasa monks and people to recall the Dalai Lama and his father.” (T 144)

“In 1730, civil strife in Bhutan had developed to the critical point. Two lamas had come forth and claimed to be reincarnations of the head lama of Bhutan. Both claimants found supporters among the Bhutanese chiefs, and raids and murders became frequent. The eighth Bhutanese ruler was murdered by his successor for having sent an official to solicit help from Pholhanas. Tibetan troops invaded Bhutan in 1730 and

forced the Bhutanese to recognize one of the claimants as the head lama. They also forced the Bhutanese to give up prisoners and captured territory. The Bhutanese chiefs exchanged letters swearing to uphold the peace. The settlement of the dispute appears to have been appreciated by the Bhutanese, who sent representatives to Pholhanas and to the Dalai Lama to thank them for their good offices.” (T145)

The Manchu Emperor, who had an increasing influence on the Tibetan government, began to give large amounts of money to the Tibetan monasteries. “In the long run, the Manchus found it cheaper to spend money on monasteries than on troops in order to pacify the border Tibetans. By encouraging more Tibetans to become monks, they were also reducing the number of potential soldiers.” (T 147) In 1747, Pholhanas died. “During the nineteen years that he had ruled Tibet, there had been uninterrupted peace and prosperity throughout the countryside.” (T 147) Despite being sent to Kham for seven years, the Dalai Lama admired Pholhanas’ political abilities.

His son took over, and requested that the Manchu troops leave Lhasa; as “Tibetan troops were quite capable of guarding the Dalai Lama and the security of the country.” (T 148) He was suspected of being disloyal to the Manchus and he and his attendants were murdered with swords at a party. The supporters of Pholhanas’ son heard of the killings and stormed the office of the Manchus. “Over one hundred Chinese soldiers and civilians were killed and the residence (was) put to torch. The night was filled with confusion and panic. Some two hundred Chinese—soldiers, merchants, and civilians—took refuge in the Potala and survived the fury of the mob under the protection of the Dalai Lama himself. The Dalai Lama appealed to his people to refrain from violence and even had posters to this effect put up; but the incensed populace tore them down.” (T 149) The

murdered ruler did not like the Dalai Lama, yet was admired for his patriotism and efforts to rid Tibet of foreign influence.

“In 1751, the Dalai Lama assumed full spiritual and temporal powers over Tibet.” (T 150) The Dalai Lama appointed new ministers, calling them the “Kashag.” “The Kashag took over the army and established it as a permanent force. The army consisted of ‘regulars’ for the first time, not part-time soldiers conscripted from the populace during an emergency. Each landowning family was required to provide one member for the army. Two generals were appointed for the province of U, with 1000 troops; and four generals for Tsang, with 2000 troops.” (T 151)

After the death of the seventh Dalai Lama, a regent was appointed for the first time to rule while the next incarnation was underage. In 1772, the Bhutanese invaded a small neighbor territory. “Warren Hastings, the Governor General of Bengal, dispatched an Indian battalion to drive the Bhutanese out of (the territory). At that point, the Panchen Lama interceded at the request of the Bhutanese and sent a deputation to Warren Hastings with a letter asking for an end to the hostilities. Soon after, in 1774, a treaty of amity and commerce was signed between the British East India Company and Bhutan.” (T 154) In late 1780, local leaders had been exercising more power than the Tibetan government had granted them, and the Regent sent in troops to suppress these leaders, which took two years. “The culprits were finally executed and their followers exiled.” (T 155)

In 1788, a conflict broke out between Nepal and Tibet regarding copper coins that the Nepalese had sold to Tibet as if they were solid gold, yet had now devalued. There were other areas of conflict as well, including the quality standards of salt and wool going

into Nepal. The Gurkha army invaded lower Tibet, and the small Tibetan resistance suffered heavy losses. Troops were brought in from all three regions of Tibet. A young member of the Kashag, who acted as a guide for an imperial army from China that came to help out, wrote,

“ I gave my opinion that the Tibetan troops were doing well, and since the Chinese troops looked even more capable, we were certain to defeat the Gurkhas if we advanced. If we attacked and drove the Gurkhas out now, then we would be in a stronger bargaining position when the rest of the imperial troops did arrive. Then, if the Gurkhas did not comply with our demands, we could march into Nepal. (The general of the imperial army) then openly asked me if there was no way in which we could negotiate with the Gurkhas and suggested that I write to the Dalai Lama about it. I told him that I would not pass my responsibilities on to the Dalai Lama. We had been sent to Shigatse to fight, and fight we must! ” (T 158)

Due to the Chinese army generals’ desire for a truce, the Panchen Lama’s father and the secretary of the Sakya School came to negotiate. They were viewed by the Nepalese as not being powerful enough figures to lead negotiations, and were not successful. The Chinese general requested that a representative of the eighth Dalai Lama come to negotiate, but this made many suspicious. “Four Tibetan generals urged the Chinese to make the most of their strong position and bring the war to a definite conclusion, instead of entering into negotiations with the enemy before a single battle had been fought.” The two original negotiators were bullied into signing a treaty with the Gurkhas, which was very harmful financially for the Tibetans. The Chinese presence was viewed as much more of a hindrance than a help. One of the generals “said that there was little difference between the Gurkhas and the Chinese. The former looted and killed because they came as enemies; but the Chinese did the same thing and they came as friends.” (T 162) Embarrassed at how he had dealt with the conflict, the Manchu general later committed suicide. The Tibetans paid a large tribute, and the Gurkha moved

out of Tibetan territory. The Regent severely punished the generals and government officials involved in signing the humiliating treaty with Nepal.

Tibetan representatives went to Nepal to plead for a lowering of the tribute payment, but they were rejected. The Regent became angry and “said that if the Nepalese wanted their tribute, they could come and get it themselves. The combined armies of central Tibet would be kept in readiness and he, the Regent, in spite of being an old man who had already served a seven-year term as Ganden Tri Rinpoche (abbot of Ganden monastery), would personally command the military operations.” (T 163) The Regent died shortly after making this statement. Representatives were again sent for negotiations. Both sides met in Southern Tibet, and the Nepalese asked permission to celebrate one of their festivals in the Tibetan fortress in which they were both staying. The Tibetans agreed, and as the party went on, drunken Gurkha soldiers “fell upon the Tibetan officials, who had been watching the celebrations. After a fierce fight, the officials were subdued and put in chains (before being) taken over the border into Nepal. Three Tibetan officials and thirty-five attendants were killed in the fighting, along with more than one hundred Gurkhas.” (T 164)

The Gurkha army then looted the Panchen Lama’s monastery, causing him to flee to Lhasa. Many homes and monasteries were looted for their gold in Shigatse. The Manchu representative in Lhasa feared that the Gurkhas would make their way to the capitol city, and advised the Dalai Lama to leave for Kham. This threw the city into a panic. The Dalai Lama addressed his people in Lhasa, and assured them that he would not leave and that Lhasa would be safe. Still, many officials packed all of their valuables in preparation for flight. The abbots of the three big monasteries held a meeting at the

Potala, and scolded these timid officials, saying that the Chinese didn't have any interest in protecting Tibet and that they themselves would protect the Dalai Lama from the Gurkha army. "The outspoken attitude of the abbots put an end to all preparations for the Dalai Lama's possible departure and strengthened the morale of the army and its commanders." (T 166) A group of 10,000 Tibetan troops drove the Gurkhas out of Shigatse and further southward. Thirteen thousand Chinese troops joined the effort. The combined forces drove the troops into Nepal without difficulty. The Nepalese general poisoned himself after the defeat.

The recently deceased general was blamed for the war, and "the Nepalese willingness to negotiate for peace was heavily stressed." (T 167) A Nepalese representative met the Tibetan side in Northern Nepal for a truce. "The Nepalese representative was held as a hostage, while his attendants were allowed to return to Kathmandu with a message giving the conditions for peace." (T 167) The conditions included returning all prisoners and returning all valuables looted, and forgetting all causes of past conflict. They were agreed to in 1792. The Manchu military influence was still thoroughly unappreciated by the Tibetans, and "posters protesting the exploitation and interference of the Manchu Ambans in Tibetan affairs and demanding the withdrawal of imperial troops" were put up. (T 168) The general feeling was that "their presence had caused a hundred times more harm to the Tibetans than the Gurkha invasion." (T 168)

"During the 1814 Gurkha war with the British in India, the Nepalese King appealed to the Tibetan Government for assistance. Although it is not known whether an official reply was sent, there is in existence a letter written by the Regent to the heads of

monasteries in Tibet saying that prayers should be offered for Nepal's success in the war." (T 174) In 1832 the regions in Mongolia bordering Tibet broke out in civil war. The Regent of Tibet dispatched troops to the area to calm the fighting, and also sent troops to force some renegade areas in Kham to pay taxes to the Tibetan government. "A number of skirmishes took place with the Mongols, and soon the (instigator of the conflict in Mongolia) surrendered. (He), together with his son and some other leaders, was taken to Lhasa to do homage and submit before the Dalai Lama." (T 175) The tenth Dalai Lama was not pleased with the aggressive manner in which the conflict was solved, and he scolded the Regent.

In the early 1840's the Raja of Jammu was constantly harassing the leader of Ladakh. The Maharaja of Kashmir then sent in forces to support the leader of Jammu and take over Ladakh. The fighting began to affect the bordering regions of Tibet, and Tibetan troops were sent in. These troops, hastily assembled and unprepared, were easily defeated. "Large scale Tibetan reinforcements were sent to western Tibet under the command of the council minister." (T 177) The fighting lasted into winter, at which point the council minister intensified the fighting. "Heavy snow began to fall and the half-frozen Sikhs, unaccustomed to such conditions, were unable to prevent the Tibetans from descending upon them. Fierce hand-to-hand combat ensued." (T 177) A Tibetan soldier spotted the Sikh general named Singh, and hurled a spear through his heart. "He then decapitated Singh and carried his head back to the Tibetan camp." (T 178) Over three thousand Sikhs were killed in the battle. (T 178) "Singh's army had been well-equipped with firearms and cannons, while the Tibetans were armed with swords, spears, bows, and a few primitive muskets brought from Mongolia." (T 178) The fighting ended

in a treaty in which Ladakh and Tibet promised each other “everlasting friendship, the recognition of ancient boundaries, and the continuation of trade.” (T 178)

In 1844, the members of the Kashag voted to dispose of the Regent. As two Kashag members went to collect documents from the Regent’s home, “The monks of the Sera Mey college at Sera monastery, to which (the Regent) Tsemonling belonged, showed their resentment in a forthright way. They caught the two Kashag ministers at Tsemonling’s house and gave them a severe beating. (One of the members) was so critically injured he could not attend to his Kashag duties; he died a few months later.” (T 180) In 1855, the Gurkhas declared war on Tibet, saying trade agreements had been violated. “The Tibetan government sent troops from Lhasa and militia from Kham. Fighting ensued and there were casualties on both sides, but the Tibetans were unable to recover their territories. Monks from the three big monasteries volunteered to fight and left in large numbers for the battle area, but they did no actual fighting. Before the monks reached the front, the Gurkhas had opened negotiations and requested Tibetan representatives be sent to Kathmandu.” (T 181) The treaty gave Tibet back her territories in exchange for an annual tribute of 10,000 Nepali rupees.

In the late 1850’s, the Kashag decided that the Regent was becoming too powerful, and that there should be an assistant to help him carry out decisions. One of the council ministers of the Kashag named Shatra, who had initiated the decision, was exiled by the Regent. Shatra wrote a letter to his friend in Nepal, who happened to be a Nepalese minister, telling him what had happened. The letter was intercepted by the Regent, who became angry and thought that the ex-council minister was conspiring with Nepal against his leadership. The Regent sent troops to the outskirts of Lhasa, instructing

them to “make sure that Shatra would never return to Lhasa. Being a monk, the regent could not openly suggest that Shatra be killed; but that is what he implied.” (T 185)

Shatra was imprisoned in a monastery, under close surveillance. Shatra asked Ganden monastery through a friend of his to rebel against the Regent. Shatra also used a grain controversy between the Regent and Drepung monastery to rouse them into a rebellious spirit. “The monks of Ganden and Drepung then joined forces and effected the release of Shatra, bringing him to the outskirts of Lhasa. The eleventh Dalai Lama supported him, and they exchanged scarves through messengers as Shatra neared Lhasa. Monks from Sera who supported the Regent came to protect him along with government troops. This protective effort proved futile, and Shatra occupied the Potala and Jokhang temple, appointing himself Desi (Prime Minister). The Regent’s house was raided by the monks from Ganden and Drepung, and he fled to China. The Regent requested the Manchu Emperor help in restoring his power, but all the Emperor could do was write a letter to the Desi asking that the Regent be allowed back into Lhasa to live peacefully. This was granted, and the Regent died on his way back from China.” (T 187)

“Meanwhile, Gompa Nambyal, (a) chief in eastern Tibet, was using his standing army to spread a reign of terror in (that region).” (T 187) The Tibetan government sent in troops to stop him, after some six thousand people had fled the region. The fighting lasted for two years, ending when the chief was driven into his fort which was set on fire, killing him. The new Lord Chamberlain, the Dalai Lama’s chief political advisor, “always kept a fresh, bloodied animal skin outside of his office entrance and threatened to sew up in it anyone who disobeyed his orders. He had, in fact, done just that on several occasions, throwing his victims in the river.” (T 188)

The Lord Chamberlain had a plan to remove the Dalai Lama from power and place him in a hermitage, and held a meeting with the ministers of the Kashag. The meeting lasted several days, and news spread that he had arrested three of the ministers and killed one of them through his gruesome animal skin method. The Dalai Lama's assistant asked the abbots of Drepung monastery "to arrest and beat up (the Lord Chamberlain's) attendants and any other monks (who supported him) in Drepung." (T 189)

The Lord Chamberlain hid in Ganden, but the monks from Sera and government troops surrounded the monastery and cut off food supplies. He escaped at night, but soon after committed suicide when his pursuers neared. "The Sera monks who had long nursed their grudge, joined the government troops in the attack on Ganden, and several houses were put to the torch." (T 190)

In 1895, when the 13th Dalai Lama became old enough to rule the country, and the Regent had to step down, the newly jobless Regent tried to kill the Dalai Lama through witchcraft. The state oracle found out about the attempt, and the ex-Regent was imprisoned for life.

Tibet and Britain had poor relations in the late 1800's, based mostly on mutual misunderstanding and lack of communication. In 1888, Britain was annoyed at the Tibetan military check post at the border with India and asked Tibet to remove it. The Tibetan government refused to remove the post and Britain threatened to invade, which they did in March of 1888. They had four cannons and 2000 troops and easily wiped out the Tibetan troops, killing hundreds. (T 200)

Then in 1903, Colonial Francis Younghusband led British troops into Tibet to discuss trade relations between Tibet and Britain. The Tibetans insisted the negotiations be at the border, while the British wanted it to be in Tibet. The British had a much larger army and forced their desires on the Tibetans, waiting at their chosen location for three months, but getting little cooperation from the Tibetans.

“The Kashag stressed the necessity of bringing about a peaceful settlement instead of resorting to military action, for it realized the Tibetans had no adequate reinforcements for such an undertaking. The (National Assembly), on the other hand, was completely ignorant of British military might and it declared that Tibet would fight to the last man.” (T 208)

The Younghusband crew came with “5000 Sikh and Gurkha troops, armed with rifles, machine guns, and artillery.” (T 209) Negotiations were attempted several times, but failed. Younghusband surrounded the Tibetan troops’ fortress and as he was discussing a truce with the Tibetan general, the British opened fire and killed 500 defenseless, unarmed Tibetans. Still, the Tibetan army generals were determined to fight the British to the end. The British marched on to Gyantse, a major city in south central Tibet, killing hundreds of Tibetan peasants on their way. The Manchu emperor representative in Lhasa, whom Younghusband assumed had the most influence in Tibet, was refused transport by the Tibetan government and no high-ranking Tibetan official was sent in his place. Frustrated, Younghusband planned to go to Lhasa to meet the Dalai Lama himself.

At Gyantse, Younghusband killed 300 more Tibetan soldiers, before leaving for Lhasa. The Dalai Lama pleaded that negotiations be held outside of Lhasa, but

Younghusband refused. This frightened the Kashag, and the Dalai Lama fled north.

Younghusband set up camp in Lhasa and negotiations were held with the Tibetan government.

“While discussions were going on, a Tibetan monk managed to get into the British camp and attacked two officers of the medical service, severely wounding them. The monk was caught and subsequently hanged in public. During the rest of the time the British remained in Lhasa, a Tibetan official and a monk delegate from each of the three big monasteries were kept as hostages in the British camp to prevent a repetition of the attack on the officers.” (T 216)

A convention was signed in 1904 in the Potala that said that without British permission, no other foreign power could exert any influence over Tibet. It formed trade relations between the British and Tibetans and recognized Tibet as a sovereign nation. The Tibetan government also had to pay 1000 rupees compensation for two Tibetans who had helped the British, and subsequently been beaten to death by the Tibetan army for their treachery. The Dalai Lama returned as Younghusband left. In 1908, an agreement was signed in Peking that ratified the same treaty of 1904, but in China. The Tibetan representative that signed the agreement had no authority with the Tibetan government and was assassinated for harming the Tibetan claim to be independent from China.

In 1908, the Dalai Lama went to Peking and met a Japanese Buddhist priest and a Japanese military expert, who would later teach the Tibetan army. The Dalai Lama held talks with the Emperor's wife, who ruled the country in place of her ill husband, asking her to respect Tibetan autonomy and to remove Chinese troops from border areas.

In 1903 a Chinese representative in Tibet visited a monastery in the Lithang area and said that since there were so many monks there, some of them should become farmers. “The monks took offense at the Amban’s remarks and murdered him and his escort.” Chinese troops came in and arrested and executed 322 monks along with burning down parts of the monastery. (T 225)

Chinese troops came in two years later and heavily fined the monastery for the killing of the representative, along with killing four more monks. Two monks from Lithang protested and were killed. When locals began organizing a larger protest, more troops were sent in and 1200 monks and laymen were killed. (T 225) Still unsatisfied with their attempts at revenge, troops came in the next year to kill seven elderly monks at Lithang and 48 monks at another nearby monastery. (T 225)

The Chinese continued to bully their way through eastern Tibet until in 1910 they entered Lhasa, killing policemen and firing at the Potala. The Dalai Lama fled to the border with Sikkim. The Chinese general demanded the head of the Dalai Lama and he was pursued. Tibetan troops killed 70 Chinese soldiers to their two casualties in a two-day skirmish outside of Lhasa to protect the fleeing leader of Tibet. (T 230) The Dalai Lama continued on into India to seek help. The Panchen Lama, at this time, sold out to Chinese interests and helped them greatly.

“A number of the Dalai Lama’s junior officials in Darjeeling volunteered to return to Tibet and fight. They arrived in Tsang and organized uprisings. They attacked the Chinese at Shigatse and Gyantse; but they suffered severe losses and had to return in disgrace to Darjeeling, where for a time they were ridiculed by the senior Tibetan officials. They were summoned into the presence of the Prime Minister, expecting to be

reprimanded; but the shrewd (man) praised their efforts. He declared them to be heroes, saying that he was sure they should be more successful in their next venture. Inspired by his confidence in them, the young officials returned again to Tibet, where they did an excellent job of organizing guerrilla resistance. Eventually, they succeeded in driving the Chinese out of the Shigatse and Gyantse. Later on, these young officials were all made generals. The Dalai Lama instructed these officials to organize in secret a War Department and to prepare for military action.” (T 239)

Sera monastery was the center for Lhasa activism, and the Chinese troops attacked it. The monks and their supporters held their own and it was a three-day standoff. The secret Tibetan military declared war on the Chinese. The Chinese military in Lhasa had become weak and was driven out. Before more casualties, the Chinese surrendered and with the help of the Nepalese government, conducted negotiations. Tibet was again a fully independent country. The severed hands and heads of Chinese soldiers were paraded through the streets of Lhasa to discourage others from questioning Tibet’s independence. Fighting continued in parts of Kham until 1918, when a British official mediated a truce, and formal boundaries were redrawn—though similar to what they had been for thousands of years.

“By the 1920’s, the Tibetan army had become very strong.” (T 264) They demanded representation in the national assembly. “The Norbulingka and the Potala were heavily guarded by monks in anticipation of a military takeover.” (T 264) The Dalai Lama dismissed the generals causing the problem and appointed new ones. From that point onwards the military weakened. In 1931 two monasteries at the Tibet-China

border began fighting. China supported one, Tibet the other, and a fierce skirmish broke out. Negotiations settled the nasty dispute, after many deaths.

After the 13th Dalai Lama's death in 1933, a political strategist looking for power disbanded a local military regiment by offering them better lives. Monks were suggested as replacement but not placed as soldiers. In 1934 Rating Rinpoche became the Regent of Tibet and took over political power. A man who tried to overthrow him that year was sentenced to death and his eyes were removed. In 1950 Tibetan border guards who had not received a message from the Lhasa government to allow an American group to enter Tibet without hindrance, killed the U.S. Vice Consul General and two non-communist Russians. The guards were punished in front of the surviving Americans. (T 276)

In 1949 the Chinese invaded Tibet, killing many and meeting little organized resistance. Jawaharlal Nehru, the Prime Minister of the newly independent India was told by China that the Chinese were simply helping the Tibetans to modernize, not invading their country, and this prevented discussion of the issue in the U.N. However, India was disappointed when they discovered China was using brute military force to achieve their aims. India's President at the time said,

“My government had been consistently following a policy of friendship with our great neighbor country, China. It was a matter of deep regret to us, therefore, that the Chinese Government should have undertaken military operations in Tibet, when the way of peaceful negotiations was open to them. Tibet is not only a neighbor of India, but has had close cultural and other ties with us for ages past. India must, therefore, necessarily concern herself with what happens in Tibet and hope that the autonomy of this peaceful country will be preserved.” (T 303)

In 1951, the Tibetan Delegation in Peking was forced to sign the infamous Seventeen Point Agreement, which China would repeatedly violate in the coming years. In 1954, the 14th Dalai Lama went to Peking for negotiations and was given many empty

promises by Mao Tse-Tung. The Dalai Lama was appointed Chairman of the ineffectual “Preparatory Committee for the Autonomous Region of Tibet,” which was a Communist tool disguised by its supposed significance. In 1956 the Dalai Lama was reluctantly allowed to go to the celebration of the Buddha’s 2500th birthday in India, and had the opportunity to talk with Nehru and strategize. Nehru, to the Dalai Lama’s frustration, continued to trust and side with China. Nehru asked the Dalai Lama to return to Tibet rather than seek refuge, and work toward a peaceful solution.

“By 1958 the Tibetan peoples of the Kham and Amdo regions were taking to the mountains as guerrilla fighters. The Chinese had used artillery to shell monasteries and towns without mercy. Cases of genocide were widespread. The resistance movement had grown considerably and gradually spread to other provinces of Tibet.” (T 316) “The Chinese army had been trying to crush the revolts in eastern Tibet, but with little success. Instead, their attacks had created even more hatred and opposition. The Chinese therefore insisted that the Tibetan government should take action against the resistance forces by dispatching Tibetan troops to suppress the revolts. The Tibetan government pondered over this matter and concluded that if Tibetan troops were sent to fight the Voluntary National Defense Army, it would be a question of Tibetans killing Tibetans. This was the worst possible thing that could happen and was out of the question. Another possibility was that Tibetan troops sent to cope with the revolts might instead join the revolutionary forces, resulting in greater disturbances and more suffering for the Tibetan people. The Chinese had already threatened to use heavily armed Chinese troops to crush the revolt if the Tibetan government did not take action. The government was reluctant to do anything, but eventually a decision was made to send government representatives to

various revolutionary posts and to try to persuade the guerrillas to lay down their arms peacefully. This plan was carried out, but the representatives failed to fulfill their missions.” (T 317)

“By the end of 1958, the Tibetan resistance movement had grown so much in strength that it was in a position to control completely almost all the districts of southern Tibet and numerous areas in eastern Tibet. The Tibetan government, while trying to settle peacefully all conflicts in favor of Tibet, felt its chances dwindling as the Chinese steadily strengthened their forces. News continued to reach Lhasa of the victories of the Tibetan Army and intense feelings of patriotism inspired the people in and around Lhasa, but over it all reigned a constant anxiety for the safety of the Dalai Lama’s person.” (T 318)

The Dalai Lama was invited to a cultural performance put on by the Chinese Communists, but no bodyguards were allowed to accompany him. The Tibetan community heard of this and got suspicious, and surrounded the Dalai Lama’s summer palace in protest. Several days of intense, citywide revolts followed, starting on March 10th. On the evening of March 17th, the Dalai Lama escaped in secrecy and a large cavalry escorted him to India, led by the Khampa guerrilla fighters. Enormous uprisings took place in Lhasa, and thousands of Tibetans were killed.

“On March 19, two days after the Dalai Lama’s flight from Lhasa, the Chinese had shelled the Norbulingka, the Potala and other strategic places in Lhasa. The shelling was followed by tank and infantry attacks. Some 12,000 people were mercilessly killed, and many were taken prisoners.” (T 320)

The preceding account of the initial Chinese invasion in 1949 to the Dalai Lama's escape and subsequent uprising was according to Tsepon W.D. Shakabpa, long time member of the Dalai Lama's cabinet (Kashag). He is very well informed and his perspective is that of a long time Tibetan government insider. This decade was so pivotal for Tibet that I am going to give three more versions of it. The following version comes from the Dalai Lama himself, from his autobiographies My Land, My People (1962) and Freedom in Exile (1998).

Upon invasion in 1949, "the Assembly agreed unanimously that Tibet had neither the material resources nor the arms or men to defend its integrity against a serious attack, and so they decided to make an urgent appeal to other counties." No help came. (M 81)

"(In Chamdo) resentment was boiling, and people told me stories of oppressions and injustices, of peasants dispossessed of land, and of promises which the Tibetans believed at first but the Chinese had always broken. And there was an added danger of sudden violence: this was the district where the Khampas lived, and the most precious possession of a Khampa was his rifle. Now the Khampas had heard that the Chinese were going to demand that all arms should be surrendered, and I knew, without being told, that a Khampa would never surrender his rifle—he would use it first." (M 129)

In 1956, twenty government officials in the border areas of Tibet were called to a meeting in Chamdo to implement Chinese reforms in their areas. They were instead locked in a fort for twenty days in an attempt to make them obedient. When security lapsed one night, all 200 escaped to the mountains. The Dalai Lama remarks,

"So, by this senseless action, the Chinese had driven most of the leading men of the district into the life of guerrillas, outlaws who knew they would be arrested if they ever went back to their homes. They formed a nucleus, which grew and was bound to keep growing. They had to depend for their defense on such arms and

ammunition as they could capture from the Chinese; so they had to fight, whether it was their inclination or not. Those eastern Tibetans, the Khampas in particular, are tough and resolute people. They know their mountains and the mountains were ideal for guerrilla warfare. Already in the first half of 1956, there were stories of their raids on Chinese roads and depots. This seemed to me to be a desperate situation without any imaginable end. In those impregnable mountains, the guerrillas could hold out for years. The Chinese would never be able to dislodge them. They would never be able to defeat the Chinese army. And however long it went on, it would be the Tibetan people, especially the women and the children, who would suffer.” (M 137)

In his second autobiography, he reflects,

“During the summer of 1956, an incident occurred which brought me more unhappiness than at almost any time before or since. The Khampa/Amdowa freedom-fighters alliance began to have considerable success. By May/June, numerous sections of the Chinese military road had been destroyed along with a great many bridges. As a result, the PLA drafted 40,000 troop reinforcements. This was exactly what I had feared. No matter how successful the resistance was, the Chinese would overcome it in the end by sheer force of numbers and superior fire-power. But I could not have predicted the aerial bombing of the monastery at Lithang in Kham. When I heard of it, I cried. I could not believe that human beings were capable of such cruelty to each other.

“This bombardment was followed by the merciless torture and execution of women and children whose fathers and husbands had joined the resistance movement and, incredibly, by the disgusting abuse of monks and nuns. After arrest, these simple, religious people were forced in public to break their vows of celibacy with one another and even to kill people.” (FIE 121)

The Dalai Lama was allowed in 1956 to attend the 2500th anniversary of the

Buddha’s life in India. He recalls,

“I made a pilgrimage to the banks of the Jamuna River, where Mahatma Gandhi was cremated. It was a calm and beautiful spot and I felt very grateful to be there, the guest of a people who, like mine, had endured foreign domination; grateful also to be in a country that had adopted *Ahimsa*, the Mahatma’s doctrine of non-violence. As I stood praying, I experienced simultaneously great sadness at not being able to meet Gandhi in person and great joy at the magnificent example of his life. To me, he was—and is—the consummate politician, a man who put his belief in altruism above any personal considerations. I was convinced too that his devotion to the cause of nonviolence was the only way to conduct politics.

“The next few days were taken up with the Buddha Jyanti celebrations. During these, I spoke of my belief that the teachings of the Lord Buddha could lead not

only to peace in the lives of individuals, but also to peace between nations. I also took the opportunity to have discussions with many Gandhians about how India had achieved independence through nonviolence.” (FIE 127)

The Dalai Lama returned to Lhasa and stayed until the 1959 revolt. As the Dalai Lama prepared to escape into India, 100 soldiers from the Tibetan army set out to guard the place where he would cross the river. A battalion of Chinese soldiers was spotted and the Tibetan army shot five times to scare them off. As the area was known to be a Khampa fighter camp and it was getting dark, the Chinese soldiers retreated back to their camp. Thus, the Dalai Lama’s escape path was cleared. The Dalai Lama noted about his escape party, “We were escorted by about 350 Tibetan soldiers and at least 50 guerrillas. Sometimes we had no guerrilla leaders with us. They came and went, keeping in touch with all isolated bands who were living in the mountains, and we knew that we were surrounded by faithful determined men who we never saw.” (M 204)

As the escape progressed through western Tibet, a horseman came whom the Dalai Lama recognized. “Tsepon Namseling, one of the officials who had been sent by the Cabinet seven months before to persuade the Khampas to give up armed resistance, had joined the Khampas and never came back to Lhasa. He gave me detailed news of the disposition of the Chinese troops and of the skirmishes the Khampas had already had with them.” (M 206)

“Why did the Chinese do it? They ruined the Norublingka believing that I was still inside it, so clearly they no longer cared whether they killed me or not. After they discovered I was not there, either alive or dead, they continued to shell the city and the monasteries. So they deliberately killed some thousands of our people, who were only armed with sticks and knives and a few short range weapons against artillery, and could

not possibly have defended themselves or done any physical harm to the Chinese armies.” (M 207)

In his second autobiography, he elaborates on his March, 1959 impressions.

“Witnesses reported seeing them firing automatic weapons into Tibetan homes killing whole families. Unfortunately, Tibetans reacted to this not only by attacking the police and security forces, but also, in a few instances, innocent Chinese civilians. This made me very sad. It makes no sense whatsoever for Tibetans to resort to violence. If they wanted to, with a thousand million people against our six million, China could forcefully erase the entire Tibetan race from the face of the earth. It would be much more constructive if people tried to understand their supposed enemies. Learning to forgive is much more useful than merely picking up a stone and throwing it at the object of one’s anger, the more so when the provocation is extreme...While I will never condone it, I accept that some violence is inevitable.” (FIE 288)

As the escape party neared India, the Dalai Lama relates,

“I had a most welcome chance to meet some more of the leaders of the Khampas and talk to them frankly. In spite of my beliefs, I very much admired their courage and their determination to carry on the grim battle they had started for our freedom, culture, and religion. I thanked them for their strength and bravery, and also, more personally, for the protection they had given me. I asked them not to be annoyed at the government proclamations which had described them as reactionaries and bandits, and told them exactly how the Chinese had dictated these and why we had felt compelled to issue them. By then, I could not in honesty advise them to avoid violence. In order to fight, they had sacrificed their homes and all comforts and benefits of a peaceful life. Now they could see no alternative but to go on fighting, and I had none to offer. I only asked them not to use violence except in defending their position in the mountains. And I was able to warn them that our reports from Lhasa showed that the Chinese were planning to attack the part of the mountains where they were camped, so that as soon as they felt they could leave me they should go back to their defenses.” (M 209)

The Khampas were crucial in protecting the Dalai Lama in his escape—and without them the Chinese may have captured him. At the border, the Khampa and Tibetan soldiers went “back into Tibet to carry on the fight.” (M 216)

“Tens of thousands of our people have been killed, not only in military actions, but individually and deliberately. They have been killed, without trial, on suspicion of

opposing communism, or of hoarding money, or simply because of their position, or for no reason at all. But mainly and fundamentally they have been killed because they would not renounce their religion. They have not only been shot, but beaten to death, crucified, burned alive, drowned, vivisected, starved, strangled, hanged, scalded, burned alive, disemboweled, and beheaded. These killing have been done in public. Men and women have been slowly killed while their own families were forced to watch, and small children have even been forced to shoot their parents.” (M 221)

“Lamas have also been specially persecuted. The Chinese said they were unproductive and lived on the money of the people. The Chinese tried to humiliate them, especially the elderly and most respected, before they tortured them, by harnessing them to ploughs, riding them like horses, whipping and beating them, and other methods too evil to mention. And while they were slowly putting them to death, they taunted them with their religion, calling on them to perform miracles to save themselves from pain and death.” (M 221)

“Apart from these public killings, great numbers of Tibetans have been imprisoned or rounded up and taken away to unknown destinations, great numbers have died from the brutalities and privations of forced labor, and many have committed suicide in despair and misery. When men have been driven to take to the mountains as guerrillas, the women and children left in their villages have been killed with machine guns.” (M 221)

“The Chinese have destroyed hundreds of our monasteries, either by physically wrecking them, or by killing the lamas and sending the monks to labor camps, ordering

monks under the pain of death to break their vows of celibacy, and using the empty monastic buildings and temples as army barracks and stables.” (M 223)

The next version is given to us by a patriot, national hero, organizer and fighter in the “Volunteer Freedom Fighters” resistance movement. He believed that violent methods were the most effective way to combat the Chinese occupation. His name is Gompa Tashi Andrugtsang, and the following is taken from his autobiography entitled Four Rivers, Six Ranges.

In 1949 “it became clear that the Chinese were oppressing the local population and gradually depriving them of many civil rights, including freedom of worship and speech. I learned that the people had been driven to desperation and fighting was going on in Chamdo.” (F 11) “When news of the disastrous defeat of the Tibetan army followed by the fall of Chamdo reached Lhasa, it was obvious to the Dalai Lama’s Government that any serious attempt at resistance would be futile.” (F 16)

“As simple, peaceful people, contented with their lot, engrossed in religious ritual and taking delight in traditional forms of recreation, all they asked for was to be let alone in their isolated valleys and hilly plateaus. And yet this was asking for too much. Tibet was invaded and the Tibetans were forced to resist the Chinese by violence. Despite the awareness that China was a big and powerful nation possessing an awesome armed might, the Tibetans struck back, fired by the patriotic conviction that theirs was a just cause. This was particularly true of the brave Khampas of eastern Tibet.” (F 31)

“The need for organized resistance against the Chinese was becoming increasingly urgent and vital, but we had to make our moves with much caution and circumspection. In December 1956 I thought it was time to enlist the support of various

nationalist elements in Kham. So, on the pretense of undertaking a business trip, three of my men proceeded to southeastern Tibet with a message from me to various leaders in the area. The message read:

‘For some time you people have been rebelling against the Red Chinese. The time has now arrived to muster all your courage and put your bravery to the test. I know you are prepared to risk your lives and exert all your strength to defend Tibet. I also know that the tremendous task that you have undertaken is a noble cause and that you will have no regrets despite the ghastly atrocities committed by the enemy. In this hour of peril, I appeal to all people, including government servants, who value their freedom against the Chinese. Messages are being sent to people in other parts of Tibet and the neighboring countries, such as India, to explain that the Tibetans now have no alternative but to take up arms against the Chinese.’ ” (F 42)

Chinese Prime Minister Chou En-lai promised that Tibet would enjoy autonomy, even though it had “long been a part of China.” “Meaningless and empty, Chou En-lai’s promises were being cynically disregarded in eastern Tibet where the situation was rapidly deteriorating into open warfare. Atrocities continued on without let-up while the Dalai Lama was away (on his 1956 trip to India), and thousands of Khampas had fled to the mountains, organizing themselves into compact guerilla bands. A rash of rebellions broke out and enveloped the entire regions of Kham and Amdo in fire and smoke, indicative of more dangerous developments that were to follow in later years. Chinese military outposts were brazenly attacked, communications cut and large chunks of territory seized by the rebels. In early 1956, (many areas in Kham) were temporarily overrun and the Chinese garrison stationed there completely wiped out. Some six thousand Tibetan irregulars, during this period, ranged freely from their mountain hideouts, wreaking widespread havoc and destruction. A major uprising flared up in the northeastern region of Amdo where several towns fell to the Tibetans. The Chinese

succeeded in squashing the rebellion after a protracted struggle, during which the land communications to China were brought to a standstill.” (F 46)

“Retaliations inevitably followed and in June the same year Lithang was bombed by the Chinese Air Force. The Tibetans replied by staging hit and run attacks on Chinese communities across the border. These outbreaks of violence were regarded seriously by the Chinese authorities who were afraid that they would spread to the interior.” (F 46) Forty thousand Chinese soldiers were deployed to crush the resistance.

“Hate and tension increased at a frightening rate and anti-Chinese incidents began to occur frequently.” (F 48) A Tibetan named Baba Phuntsok Wangyal collaborated with the Chinese and spoke with traders from Kham and lamas from the big three monasteries to convince them that the real enemy was the Khampa guerrillas who made the Chinese reforms more difficult. The author tried to tell the same people the opposite, and explain to them the conditions the Chinese created to necessitate the resistance movement.

“In the meantime the resistance movement in Kham was gathering strength. Early in 1957 the treasurer of Lithang monastery and representatives of other monasteries met me with letters from many people in Kham. These letters urged that since the people were engaged in a fight against the Chinese, which they were determined to carry on at all costs, the Tibetan Government should give them military aid.” (F 50) Due to the Chinese government controlling the Tibetan government like puppets, such aid was not possible. “I nevertheless approached the monasteries and government officials to contribute their support to the freedom fighters in whatever way they could.” (F 50)

“Reports of increasing Chinese repression only further strengthened my conviction that we would have to strike back with force—and soon.” (F 55) The author

held a meeting to organize a movement. “The decision to actively resist the Chinese Communists was unanimously approved, and soon after we feverishly began preparations for war. We had to collect guns, ammunition and horses. Two officers of the Khadang division of the Tibetan army and a number of monks promised their support.” (F 56) The Chinese heard of the meeting and held one of their own with all of the important people of Lhasa, warning them with dire consequences if they didn’t strongly oppose the resistance movement. “The Chinese forced the Kashag to issue proclamations forbidding anyone to help or join the opponents of the Chinese on pain of punishment. Similar orders were given to the army commanders to prevent any links with the resistance movement.” (F 57)

“Sounds of gunfire were now being heard in Lhasa almost every day. We feared further trouble and were worried about the safety of the Dalai Lama. Before leaving the city, my lieutenants and I held a detailed meeting to determine our future course of action. We decided that the Tibetans should no longer remain indifferent or idle in the face of Chinese oppression and that the people should unite to defend the country and its institutions. Without further delay or hesitation I now set about organizing a volunteer force. I knew that in making this final decision to take up arms against the Chinese, I had to set aside all considerations of my own welfare and that of my family. But there was no greater or nobler cause to which I could devote myself. Our first need was for arms and ammunition. Most Khampas already possessed rifles or pistols, so a sizeable quantity of firearms was immediately available to us.” (F 59)

“News about the birth of the volunteer freedom fighters soon reached the Chinese, not all of whom were anti-Tibetan” (F 60) An artillery commander for the Chinese army

who disagreed with the Chinese policy defected and joined the guerrillas. A large meeting was held south of Lhasa in June of 1958 and the movement was officially started, complete with a flag and a logo. They called themselves the “Volunteer Freedom Fighters” and would also use the name “Four Rivers, Six Ranges” to represent the unification of Tibetans from all areas of Tibet behind the movement. Government organizations, citizens and monasteries supported them with food and money.

A group of bandits were deployed by the Chinese administration to loot Khampa villages and pose as guerrillas to give the Freedom Fighters a bad name. It did not shake the people’s conviction in the righteousness of the resistance movement, and the strategy was later discontinued.

“The task we had undertaken of fighting the Chinese was a tremendous one. Although we had a great deal of popular support there were some skeptics who for reasons of self-interest, and perhaps fearful of their own safety, were reluctant to align themselves with us. They asked: ‘What are the facilities for fighting the war? What are the sources of military supplies? What will happen if the plan to drive out the Chinese Communists fails?’ It may have been some of these skeptics who carried the news of our activities to Lhasa.” (F 67)

The Kashag and three big monasteries were given a letter by the Freedom Fighters explaining their mission. It said, “that we had no personal or individual grievances, but that the oppressive and deceitful policies of the Chinese left us no option except to fight.” (F 70) Firearms and ammunition were taken from the Tibetan Government’s regional military depots and spies were sent out to locate the Chinese camps. The Kashag sent the Freedom Fighters a letter, saying “If you give up your

warlike attitude and resort to peaceful methods the Government of Tibet will be glad to consider any problems you may have about food, housing or your other needs.” (F 70) Representatives from the Tibetan government then visited the Freedom Fighters’ headquarters, asking them to disarm. The fighters declined, and two government officials joined the fighters.

The first Volunteer Freedom Fighters confrontation with the Chinese army occurred in August 1958, with fighting lasting 2 ½ days. “In spite of the sophisticated weapons that the enemy were using, we inflicted severe losses on them. An estimated 200 Chinese were killed and an unknown number of them wounded in this engagement. We suffered 40 dead. Our relatively low losses were perhaps because of the holy charm boxes which our freedom fighters wore around their bodies. Even those who were wounded continued to fight tenaciously and gave the enemy much trouble.” (F 73)

Looking to replenish their stock of arms and ammunition, the guerrillas traveled to a Tibetan Government armory. “But we were informed by the local people that, under orders from the Kashag, most of the weapons had been distributed among the monks of a neighboring monastery, and only twenty five guns were left at the armory. Desperate for arms, a group of volunteers were sent to the (armory) while another fifty secretly surrounded the monastery at night. However, we failed to secure the cache of arms and for three days negotiations were held with the representatives of the monastery and government officials. They were reluctant to give any weapons as they had received orders from the Kashag not to give arms and ammunition to the Khampas” (F 74) The guerrillas finally convinced the monastery to give them the weaponry, which was very sizeable and profitable for them.

The freedom fighters had considerable success, considering their size. In an ambush on a Chinese convoy, “The Chinese were taken completely by surprise and our freedom fighters destroyed sixteen of their trucks including two loaded with horses. The Chinese army officers and eighteen soldiers were killed and a number of guns captured, while we escaped unscathed.” (F 75)

“The Chinese had gathered in great strength; the nearby fields and houses swarmed with their soldiers and they were armed with cannons, automatic weapons and grenades. They kept up a constant fusillade of gunfire and shelled us relentlessly. In this situation it became obvious to me that to remain in the camp was to invite certain death. I decided that our best course was to hack our way through the Chinese ranks. As the buglers in our camp sounded the signal to attack, I led seventy horses onto the field. Galloping at full speed, we charged the enemy like wild animals, fighting them hand to hand. The Chinese were unable to resist the onslaught and withdrew to a nearby village. We pursued them and battled in and around the village until they retreated further and took shelter in the houses.” (F 77)

“Most of them had taken refuge in two large houses that contained an office and some telegraph equipment. We shot down every door and window in these houses and eventually had to burn them as this was the only way to destroy the Chinese who were hiding inside. It pained us deeply to learn later that some Tibetans, too, were in the buildings and were burnt to death along with the Chinese. I believe at least 700 Chinese soldiers were killed in this battle and many more were seriously wounded. We captured a number of automatic weapons and grenades and large quantities of ammunition.” (F 77)

Everywhere they went the guerrillas met large bodies of Chinese troops. The Tibetans were highly strategic. In one battle, which was fairly typical, 200 Chinese soldiers were killed, while only one Tibetan perished. Two groups of Chinese soldiers, numbering over 10,000 each, came from either side to crush the guerrillas. (F 83) The Tibetans destroyed several Chinese trucks and killed many soldiers on the fringe in their attempt to find a safe place to recover. The Chinese caught up with the guerrillas and shelled their compound, killing two and wounding twenty—including the author. The Tibetans took off on their horses into the night and narrowly escaped disaster. The author notes, “I was wounded all over the body and was in much pain, but by the grace of the Three Precious Jewels my life was not in immediate danger.” (F 83)

The troops were alive, but hungry. “So acute was our need for food that most of the men who had been assigned scouting duties went into the hills to hunt and bag any animals they came across.” (F 84) The Chinese pursued them closely and battles ensued. In one battle, despite running out of ammunition and having to engage in hand-to-hand combat, the Tibetans killed nearly 200 and lost only 15. (F 84) However, the men marched continuously in an attempt to evade the enormous Chinese army, and were exhausted and starving.

Still, they fought on. At one particular guerrilla ambush, the Chinese suffered heavy losses and no Tibetans were killed, despite over 100 Chinese canons firing at them. The Tibetan troops managed to avoid Chinese troops and found food and safety. One guerrilla captain who had been captured by the Chinese managed to escape and join the ranks. He had learned the Chinese language and overheard Chinese generals saying that they were going to send in even more troops to wipe out the Khampas. As a result, 120

“Volunteer Freedom Fighters” (VFF) and five officers left the force and became bandits. (F 84) These defected warriors robbed and harassed Tibetans, and tarnished the reputation of the freedom fighters. Four VFF commanders and their men went to locate the bandits and enforce the law. The bandits were tried, and the officers sentenced to death. The other bandits were given fines and beatings. All of the looted property was returned. This greatly improved the VFF’s reputation. (F 90)

Many attacks were planned and carried out. One involved the loss of 550 Chinese soldiers and 20 Tibetans. Hundreds of locals supported the freedom fighters in these ambushes and a lot of damage was done in certain areas to the Chinese forces. Meetings were held to get recruits for the resistance, and 7000 new recruits joined. Food stocks and ammunition were replenished. The fighters succeeded in capturing a Chinese fortress and many locals joined them to completely wipe out the Chinese in that area. However, the Chinese resorted to air raids, and 21 Tibetans were killed as a result. The guerrillas gave arm and food to their supporters in many areas of Tibet, asking them to defend their villages and wipe out Chinese communications. (F 92)

“So far in spite of many engagements we had not suffered any mortal blow from the Chinese. We had attacked them at will and with success at many points and had also foiled or blunted their counterattacks.” (F 95) Then came the March 10th revolt. “Many people in the crowd had armed themselves with sticks, knives and even firearms. Some Khampa freedom fighters had even brought machine guns and mortars.” (F 98) The Dalai Lama escaped, the Norbulinkga and Potala were bombarded with mortars, and thousands of Tibetans were killed. During the Dalai Lama’s escape to India, he wrote a letter to the author saying,

“ ‘You have led the (“Four Rivers, Six Ranges”) force with unshakable determination to resist the Chinese occupation army for the great national cause of defending the freedom of Tibet. I confer on you the highest military rank equivalent to general in recognition of your services to the country. The present situation calls for a continuance of your brave struggle with the same determination and courage.’ ” (F 101)

“We knew that the Chinese were trailing us and would try their utmost to wipe out the Khampas and the volunteer force. We were equally determined to resist and fight them to the bitter end. Several hundred of our freedom fighters had provided an escort for the Dalai Lama on his journey to India; but they did not cross the border with him and returned to carry on the struggle.” (F 102) However, the Chinese had captured many of the guerrilla strongholds and the remaining fighters were strongly discouraged and ready to become refugees. The resistance lost its momentum and the author had no choice but to flee to India.

Before leaving, the author tried to muster one more attack on the enemy and 2000 fighters gathered. However, on the morning of the planned attack, reason crept in and they called it off. This ended over a year of constant warfare between the Khampa guerrillas and the Chinese army. After meeting with Nehru, who asked the resistance movement to practice restraint and patience, the author notes, “I therefore did my best to curb any aggressive anti-Chinese activity among my people in India. But such was their zeal and their burning desire to rescue as many Tibetans as possible that they organized a number of attacks on Chinese posts during 1960 and 1961. Most of these guerrilla sorties were launched from beyond the Tibet-Nepal border where at one time more than 4000 freedom fighters were concentrated. In some of these actions Tibetan guerrilla groups, consisting of a hundred or two hundred men, penetrated as far as a hundred miles inside Chinese-held territory. A number of Chinese weapons, including machine guns, were

captured during these encounters. As a result of these operations, some 5000 Tibetans were rescued and found refuge in India, Nepal, Bhutan or Sikkim.” (F 110)

Despite the lack of success in receiving international help, the author notes, “We have not abandoned hope and, by the grace of Lord Buddha and other deities, this hope (of independence) will be fulfilled. Tibetans must continue working for the restoration of their freedom.” (F 112) The author suffered from his many wounds inflicted in battle and became paralyzed from the waist down. He went for surgery in London, returned to India and died soon thereafter.

The translator of his autobiography writes, “Tibetans everywhere mourned the death of their great national freedom fighter. Thousands of Tibetans attended the funeral.” (F 115) His last words included, “Before I depart I must address a few words to the leaders of the (Four Rivers, Six Ranges). All of you should unite in thought and action under the leadership of His Holiness the Dalai Lama. Under his guidance all of you must constantly work with inflexible determination for the liberation of Tibet, even at the cost of your lives. The torch of the Tibetan freedom movement must be passed on to the younger generation so that its flame keeps burning and humanity remains conscious of it. Through long and personal association, I have found Mr. Gyalao Thonddup (the elder brother of the Dalai Lama) to be a man deeply devoted to the cause of Tibet. He has the capability to contribute much to our national movement. He has done much for the Volunteer Freedom Fighters from its very beginning. I feel all of you should lend your full support and cooperation to him.” (F 115)

The final version of modern Tibetan history I will include in this chapter, is given to us by Tsering Shakya, from his book The Dragon in the Land of Snows. It is a 550-

page masterwork of the history of modern Tibet since 1947. It is by far the most thorough version of this history that I have ever seen and will provide many new insights into this pivotal period for Tibet.

When the Chinese invaded in 1949, the eastern portions of Tibet, such as Kham, were the hardest hit by the new Communist reforms and campaign of terror. “The people of eastern Tibet were fond of guns” and would not allow the Chinese to confiscate them. (DLS 138) Many skirmishes broke out in Kham and the monasteries became the fortresses of local militia. These monasteries were often destroyed by aerial bomb attacks, which killed hundreds at a time and only led to more opposition. Due to the vicious suppression of these rebellions, many Khampas fled to central Tibet, where they asked the Tibetan government for help.

“To the amazement of the Khampas, their appeals landed on deaf ears in Lhasa.”(DLS 140) This was meant to protect the Dalai Lama from Chinese attacks. “Had the Dalai Lama and the Kashag given open support to the movement, then the group might have been able to mobilize the people in a popular uprising. Since the group never received overt support from the Dalai Lama and the Kashag, some people had an ambivalent attitude towards its activities.” (DLS 146) Still, thousands of Khampas kept fleeing to the Lhasa region, escaping the brutalities of the PLA. They had a strong desire to organize, collect arms and resist the Chinese. “Many Khampas felt that the failure of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Government to aid the Khampas was a great setback.” (DLS 163) In retrospect, several Khampas I talked to, including Hlasang Tsering, felt that support from the government would have given the Khampa resistance movement a

good chance at defeating the Chinese troops. In the mid 1950's throughout Tibet, many bad omens occurred, including huge earthquakes, floods and meteors in the sky.

The author makes it sound as if the preservation of Buddhism was the central motivation of the resistance movement against the Communist occupation. This adds to the intrigue of the violent methods used. The author also mentions that guns were actually placed on Buddhist altars when not in use as a way to provide the deities with a way to fight back. (DLS 139)

“By late 1957, Khampa resistance could not be regarded merely as an uprising of a few reactionary landlords—it had become a nationwide rebellion.” (DLS 166) The resistance movement finally became organized and unified with the “Four Rivers, Six Ranges” group. “The founding of the ‘Four Rivers, Six Ranges’ meant that the Chinese could no longer ignore the activities of the Khampas. They were alarmed by the gathering (at the initial meeting of the group), where there were well over 15,000 men who looked a formidable challenge to the Chinese.” (DLS 169) It was tough going, however, without governmental support. The author notes,

“Despite overwhelming support from the people, the Khampas were badly equipped and there was no way that they could lead a sustained fight against the PLA. Volunteers had to bring their own weapons and provisions, and therefore most of the Khampas were unarmed. Loden, a young Khampa who joined the resistance movement, remembered that out of eighty people in his group only twenty possessed arms. Even those who had arms had only a limited supply of ammunition. Therefore the success of the Khampas would depend on their capturing Chinese weapons.” (DLS 169)

One of the Dalai Lama's brothers, Thubten Norbu, had been talking with the American Government and the CIA for a number of years. In 1956, American agents took six Khampa guerrillas who had traveled to a U.S. military base in Pakistan, to a remote Pacific Island for training. One of the trainees “remembers that they were told by

the Americans that they regarded the Khampas as no more than a rebel group. The signing of the 17-Point agreement and the subsequent participation of the Dalai Lama and Tibetan Government officials in the Chinese National People's Congress had, according to the Americans, effectively ended Tibetan independence." (DLS 172) The guerrillas were taught how to read maps and use radio equipment and were airdropped back into Tibet. Upon better organization of the Khampa resistance movement, airdrops of weapons were promised.

The author notes,

"The Khampas were primarily concerned about the reforms carried out in their homeland. They felt that the problems of the Lhasa Government were nothing to do with them. Their separatist viewpoint was shared by the Tibetan Government, which did not concern itself with the events in eastern Tibet. Although the Khampas were united in their opposition to the reforms, they lacked coherent organization or leadership. A great many people expressed their readiness to fight the Chinese, but they were doing it for the defense of their locality, their monasteries and their lamas. The Khampas did not have a shared concept of fighting for a country. It was only after the establishment of 'Four Rivers, Six Ranges' that the Khampas began to form a united and effective opposition to the Chinese." (DLS 173)

The Khampas who had fled to the Lhasa area were not treated very kindly by the people from central Tibet. "There was also some resentment towards the Khampas from the local population; many Tibetan villagers felt intimidated by them. The relationship between Khampas and local people had begun to deteriorate. This was fuelled by the traditional prejudice against the Khampas. For many people in central Tibet, the Khampas were considered to be bandits and were more of a problem than the Chinese." (DLS 174)

In 1974, one of the guerrillas trained by the CIA "found that most of Kham was in revolt and a large Khampa militia force had gathered in the Lithang region. He

immediately radioed the Americans, informing them that there was an open revolt against the Chinese and that the majority of Khampas were actively engaged in fighting the PLA. More than 50,000 men were involved in the fighting, he reported, requesting that the CIA make an arms drop. To his dismay, the CIA refused to believe his report—apparently dismissing it as an exaggeration.”

Two of the CIA-trained guerrillas attempted to get in touch with the Dalai Lama, sending daily reports back to the Americans via two-way radios. Tibetan Government officials didn't cooperate. For that reason, American aid to the Tibetan government was not considered, and full support was given to the renegade “Four Rivers, Six Ranges” group. A low-ranking Tibetan official went with one of the CIA-trained guerrillas to Calcutta for secret meetings with the CIA. A letter from Gomba Tashi Angang—the leader of the Khampas—was given to the CIA, exposing his complete ignorance of modern warfare. The letter requested “a lethal mirror which could be shone onto the enemy, who would instantly burst into flames. Such fanciful requests did not increase America's confidence in the Khampa's ability to fight the PLA.” (DLS 178)

In the meantime, the Lhasa public was starting to change its mind. “News of the success of Khampa attacks on Chinese garrisons shifted people's sympathies towards the Khampas and, by the beginning of 1959, a sizeable number of people from central Tibet had joined the ‘Four Rivers, Six Ranges.’ ” (DLS 179) At this time the Americans made a small arms drop in Southern Tibet. The CIA-trained guerrillas “were able to report a number of successes over the PLA: in August 1958, Gomba Tashi and his men had attacked PLA troops in an area south-east of Lhasa, killing 700 Chinese soldiers. Gomba Tashi led his men further north and attacked the Chinese garrison and ransacked

storehouses. The Chinese were under great pressure from the Khampas, who moved rapidly on horseback. Most of the remote areas, stretching from Chamdo in the east to the borders of India in the south, were under the control of Khampa resistance groups. The CIA was able to make two arms drops in this area, which shows the extent of the Khampa's control." (DLS 179)

The author explains a major political quagmire,

"The Tibetans hoped that the Khampa revolt might persuade the Chinese to withdraw and allow Tibetans to reassert some authority. The Chinese, on the other hand, knew that any compromise would be seen as a sign of weakness which might intensify the Khampa revolt. Thus, from the middle of 1958 until the Lhasa uprising in March 1959, there existed a peculiar situation, in which neither the traditional Tibetan Government nor the Chinese had much control over the course of events in Tibet. The Chinese were under increasing pressure from the Khampas. The main body of the 'Four Rivers, Six Ranges' had moved further east, into areas under the control of the Chamdo Liberation Committee (CLC). Here the Khampas scored many successes and the Chinese work units came under constant attack; large numbers of PLA were deployed to protect the main supply routes. The Chinese were unable to contain the fighting within the area under CLC jurisdiction and the Khampa resistance fighters were now able to cover territory stretching from the eastern and south-eastern routes leading into India. The Chinese were desperate to eliminate the Khampas." (DLS 181)

In early 1959, Tsipon Namseling was sent to the Khampa guerrilla camp as a representative of the Kashag, asking the guerrillas to disarm and, if not, to at least avoid a rebellion in Lhasa during the Dalai Lama's examination and the subsequent Monlam Chenmo Prayer Festival. Namseling was treated with hostility and the Kashag's orders were ignored. "Gompa Tashi dispatched a written appeal to the Kashag stating that they were not lawless criminals and that their 'objective was to resist and to oust the Chinese who were oppressing our people.' He felt that 'our national institutions and way of life were being extinguished.' Instead of returning to Lhasa, Namseling and other members joined the Khampa group." (DLS 182)

The government was still terrified of the Chinese reaction to any support given to the Khampa resistance movement, so all support was in secret. The Dalai Lama's chief political advisor managed to give Gompa Tashi information on where the government had hidden arms. A great deal of the Tibetan army's weapons were stored in a monastery near Shigatse. The Dalai Lama's chief political advisor could not authorize the monks to give them to the Khampas, because the Chinese would find out about this. Instead, he encouraged the Khampas to rob the monastery. The author relates,

“In September, 1958, Gompa Tashi led 600 Khampas to the monastery and laid siege to it. The monks refused to hand over the weapons without authorization from the Kashag, fearing that if they did so, the Kashag might confiscate monastic assets. The monks resisted for three days before surrendering the weapons. A monk from the monastery later wrote that the robbery was elaborately staged to make it appear that the Khampas had forcefully taken the weapons. In reality the monks were collaborating with the Khampas, who were able to obtain a sizeable number of weapons. At the end of February, the CIA made a second arms drop for the Khampas.” (DLS 184)

“By the beginning of 1959, the Dalai Lama was ‘very near despair.’ The Khampa revolt had spread throughout Tibet and the PLA was on full alert.” (DLS 185) Then came the March 10th revolt. The author notes,

“The thousands of people who turned up outside the Norbulingka were not only expressing their anger against the Chinese but their resentment against the Tibetan ruling elite, who they believed had betrayed their leader. The huge crowd outside the gates vented its anger on the Tibetan officials believed to be pro-Chinese. One of the first to suffer from the mob's violence was a member of the delegation that had signed the 17-Point Agreement. Since the founding of the Preparatory Committee for the Autonomous Region of Tibet (PCART), he had become one of the highest-ranking Tibetan officials in the Tibet Military Commission. His jeep was driven by a Chinese chauffeur and he was wearing a PLA uniform. People started to throw stones, hitting him on the head as he got out of the jeep. Later he was rushed to the hospital.

“A member of the Chamdo Liberation Committee and the Religious Affairs Committee of the PCART named Khunchung Gyatso first came to the Norbulinka for the morning tea ceremony, wearing traditional Tibetan monk's attire. Later, however, he returned to watch the crowd outside the palace, having changed to a

white shirt, dark trousers and a Chinese cap with a white facemask of the sort the Chinese often used to keep out dust. This simple act seemed to have enraged the public, who attacked him and beat him to death. The angry crowd dragged his body all around the center of Lhasa... The masses held the Tibetan elite responsible for what they saw as the 'betrayal' of the Dalai Lama and their faith.

“Once ordinary men and women had been mobilized, the question of the Dalai Lama’s visit to the show was no longer important and the crowd defiantly marched towards Lhasa dragging Khunchung’s body. His killing showed both public defiance of the Chinese and the extent to which the masses had taken control of the political agenda from the Tibetan ruling classes.” (DLS 194)

The Dalai Lama escaped, but the revolts continued. “The Kashag began to authorize the distribution of arms from the government arsenals on the third day of the uprising.” (DLS 203) Many old rifles were taken from the Potala and from monasteries and distributed among the demonstrators. The PLA finally cracked down, killing thousands on March 19th and 20th. “The streets were littered with corpses, some of which had been there for several days and had been mauled by stray dogs. People rushed out to identify the bodies and look for relatives who had failed to return home.” (DLS 204)

Most of the people who fought in the uprising were unarmed. “Langdun Gyatso remembers that 500 people in his Carpenters’ and Masons’ Association had two rifles and about 25 pistols between them. ‘The only thing we could do was to arm ourselves for hand-to-hand combat and so we prepared knives, swords and an assortment of fierce but, as it turned out later, perfectly useless weapons.’ ” (DLS 204)

The Dalai Lama’s escape route was lined with Khampa guerrillas guarding the fringe. Along the way, the Dalai Lama met with Athar Norbu, who had been the primary coordinator between the CIA and the Khampa guerrillas. This gave the CIA confidence, and they planned to make an airdrop of several thousand arms. Due to the PLA’s pursuit of the Dalai Lama and subsequent raids on the “Four Rivers, Six ranges” bases however,

this airdrop never took place. (DLS 205) The Kashag briefly thought about setting up a new Tibetan government in western Tibet, and the CIA even offered to provide security to the Dalai Lama, but the rapid advance of the PLA foiled those plans as well.

“The 1959 revolt marked the end of the attempt to forge a co-existence between Communist China and Buddhist Tibet. The flight of the Dalai Lama symbolized the final demise of Tibet as an autonomous entity within the People’s Republic of China.” (DLS 208) In 1960, the “Four Rivers, Six Ranges” group moved their base to Mustang in northern Nepal. One hundred and fifty guerrillas were CIA-trained in the Pacific Islands and in Colorado. (DLS 284) They were given airdrops of arms in Mustang and led several revolts throughout southern Tibet in the 1960’s. The Nepali, Chinese and Tibetan governments tolerated the Mustang base until 1974, when the Nepalese government got pressure from China to close it, and the Dalai Lama was forced to send a tape-recorded message to disband it. Many of the guerrillas committed suicide upon hearing the Dalai Lama’s message, which they took as the ultimate defeat of their 25-year war with the Chinese.

Then came the “Cultural Revolution.” There was a mandate from Peking that all things religious be “smashed.” (DLS 320) Thousands of monasteries were destroyed, monks and nuns tortured and forced to do unspeakable acts, and the religious people of Tibet hurled into unfathomable despair. Tibetans were forced to take part in the severe beatings, humiliation and torture of members of the “exploiting class”—primarily lamas, monks and nuns. The author states,

“China’s hostility towards Tibetan culture continued, as did officially condoned violence against people with bad class labels. Although Tibetans participated in the violence, their participation was due to a high level of coercive persuasion by the Chinese authorities... At the time, it appeared as though the Chinese had

succeeded in remolding Tibetan society: Tibetans were driven with revolutionary fervor and took part in the destruction of temples and monasteries. There was extreme use of violence both by the Tibetans and Chinese during the Cultural Revolution. The Chinese power to consign labels and extend patronage goes some way towards explaining this violence, which allowed people who had bad class and political labels, and even their children, to be subjected to beatings, abuse or constant humiliation. Those who attacked people with a bad label could do so without any consequence because the violence was sanctioned by the Chinese authorities.” (DLS 344)

In 1969, a major revolt took place at the peak of the Cultural Revolution’s bloody pitch. A woman named Thrinley Choedron led the revolt. “She and her followers identified their target as ‘the enemies of the faith.’ Thrinley Choedron and her gang marched to the (local Chinese) headquarters, armed with swords and spears, and proceeded to slaughter almost all of the Chinese there, along with their Tibetan workers. The Tibetans who had supported the Chinese had their hands cut off. The uprising was characterized by extreme brutality. It was reported that some of the Chinese were set on fire and their arms and legs amputated.” (DLS 345)

The author continues, “Her fame spread quickly and attracted hundreds of followers. She had brought to the surface the latent anger of the Tibetans. Immediately, there were rumors that she was possessed by a local deity and that she had acquired supernatural and magical powers.” The spirit of the revolt, which the author claims was a fight for the preservation of Buddhism in the peak of cultural destruction, spread throughout the region. “The Chinese had to deploy the PLA to suppress the revolt. Thrinley Choedron and her followers fled into the mountains from where they waged guerrilla war, but they were no match for the PLA, who eventually succeeded in capturing them.” (DLS 346) They were publicly executed and order was restored.

In 1987, the Dalai Lama spoke before the United States Congress, unveiling his “Five Point Peace Plan.” Monks in Tibet got word of this, and took it as a signal to act.

The author relates,

“Twenty-one monks from Drepung Monastery marched to Lhasa and staged the first pro-independence demonstration (in several years). The monks circled around the center of Lhasa, carrying the Tibetan national flag, and shouted demands for Tibetan independence. The demonstration was immediately suppressed by the Chinese police, and most of the monks were beaten and arrested. Later they were charged with being counter-revolutionaries. News of the beatings triggered off further protests. Early on the morning of October 1st, a group of monks from Sera monastery staged a second demonstration. The monks and about thirty lay people were once again beaten by the police in the street, and this was witnessed by many people, including Western tourists. Later, while the monks were detained in the policed station, at least 1000 Tibetans congregated outside the police station demanding their release. This soon developed into a confrontation between the police and the Tibetans. The Chinese police lost control and the demonstrators burnt down the doors of the police station and released the prisoners. One of the Tibetans, badly burned in the fire, was carried on the shoulders of the demonstrators, in front of a crowd which had swelled to (a few thousand) people. The Chinese police fired into the crowd and between eight and ten people were killed.” (DLS 416)

In the 1980’s some monasteries were allowed to re-open and religious freedoms were increased. The monks and nuns formed the nucleus of the political activist energy in Tibet, and the Chinese developed many ways of dealing with this. These included “re-education campaigns” in the monastery, forcing monks and nuns to denounce the Dalai Lama, and torturing those who refused to obey. (DLS 419) The rift, which the author boils down to “Buddhism versus Communism,” was as strong as ever. These same conflicts are still present today.

In Chapter Six, I will explore further the Dalai Lama’s nonviolence policy, protests and controversies in exile, and more of how Tibetans view nonviolence through their ancient cultural traditions and historical myths and realities.

